Tuesday, July 24, 2007
Another week away - Summer School
For the past week, I was away in Germany at the 5th Neuro-IT summer school in Delmenhorst (near Bremen), hence no posts. I hope to post a few of my (bullet-pointed) notes on some of the talks over the next few days - the subjects were very varied and technical, and needless to say, extremely interesting. To my dissapointment, one of the people I went to see, Ezequiel di Paolo, wasn't able to attend, but the school was nevertheless excellent.
Thursday, July 12, 2007
Walking like us: Runbot
The BBC technology news has today reported on a small robot called Runbot, which has been designed to walk in a way mechanically similar to humans - in contrast to robots such as Asimo, which has each of its movements meticulously calculated and executed using precise control algorithms, leading to its unnatural gait. Runbot takes advantage of morphology and environmental characteristics (such as gravity) in much the same way as Passive Dynamic Walkers (PDW's - such as the Cornell walker), although it moves further by incorporating learning and motor mechanisms to enable walking over slopes (both up and down) and flat surfaces, which PDW's can not. The control architecture is not centralised but distributed, using nested artificial neural networks, and the ability to learn from previous experience. This enables 'normal' walking behaviour to be carried out relatively automatically (as with the PDW's), but when the circumstances change (for instance when an incline is encountered), higher level processes use the previously learned information to mainting balance and forward momentum. In this way, speeds of up to three leg lengths per second are achievable, which is only slightly slower than the fastest walking human.
UPDATE 14/07: Madam Fathom has a much more detailed overview of the Runbot here, describing central pattern generators, and the hierarchical organisation. Well worth a look.
UPDATE 14/07: Madam Fathom has a much more detailed overview of the Runbot here, describing central pattern generators, and the hierarchical organisation. Well worth a look.
Monday, July 02, 2007
The Encephalon anniversary edition... and holidays
Since I'm off on holiday for the next week, I won't be able to link to the newest edition of Encephalon, which also happens to be its first anniversary. So I'll link to the place it's going to be (as I understand it...): the all new Neurophilosophy @ Scienceblogs! And I hope to post again on the 12th...
Monday, June 25, 2007
Putting the brakes on Enactive Perception
The view that perception is enactive (i.e. that perception and action are intrinsically combined, that perception is dependant on action) is one which is gaining in popularity. There are numerous proponents of this view, one of the most notable of which is Alva Noe, whose book "Action in Perception" (2005, a review in Nature is here) reviews many of the arguments (both philosophical and empirical) in support. There are however those who don't agree with this view. Jesse Prinz is one of these. In the paper "putting the brakes on enactive perception", he responds to what he sees are the core arguments put forward by Noe, and attempts to show that the theory of enactive perception as described by Noe doesn't threaten the 'traditional' view of a hard distinction between action and perception. Furthermore, he argues against the view that the mind is emergent from the interaction between brain and environment, favouring instead that which views the brain as being the sole basis for mind. On a personal note, I found the paper very easy reading, laying out philosophical concepts (which I sometimes have trouble understanding) very clearly. Abstract below, and reference at end:
Jesse Prinz (2006), "Putting the brakes on Enactive Perception", Psyche, vol 12, issue 1
Alva Noë’s Action in Perception offers a provocative and vigorous defense of the thesis that vision is enactive: visual experience depends on dispositional motor responses. On this view, vision and action are inextricably bound. In this review, I argue against enactive perception. I raise objections to seven lines of evidence that appear in Noë’s book, and I indicate some reasons for thinking that vision can operate independently of motor responses. I conclude that the relationship between vision and action is causal, not constitutive. I then address three other contentious hypotheses in the book. Noë argues that visual states are not pictorial; he argues that all perception is conceptual; and he argues that the external world makes a constitutive contribution to experience. I am unpersuaded by these arguments, and I offer reasons to resist Noë’s conclusions.Reference:
Jesse Prinz (2006), "Putting the brakes on Enactive Perception", Psyche, vol 12, issue 1
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)